Argument that G4 Route Weakens India's UNSC Case is a Red Herring


by Sanjay Baru 
In a world of multiple partnerships, there is always space for a new club of the willing. Knee-jerk criticism of the Narendra Modi government's decision to breathe life into the moribund G4 — the alliance of Brazil, Germany, India and Japan — is misplaced. 
The G4 may not yet achieve their immediate objective of securing permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), but there is much that they can do to underscore the urgency of reforming an outdated, antediluvian global governance system. 
Each of the four countries has a global profile and are cornerstones of regional security in their respective regions. They play an important role in other multilateral forums and organisations, and have contributed more to global and regional peace, security and development than some of the existing permanent members, the P5. 
Whatever the reasons for the G4 initiative to have lost steam since its first launch over a decade ago, each of the four countries has new reasons to come together and assert their global relevance. Germany has been embattled within Europe since 2009, Japan has been under Chinese pressure, Brazil's economy has lost momentum just before it hosts the 2016 Olympic Games, and India is seeking to regain momentum both economically and geopolitically after the wasted second term of the Manmohan Singh government. 
The case for G4 is easily made. There is no reason at all why the socalled victors of World War 2 — 'socalled' because the contribution of Gaullist France and Communist China to the defeat of fascism is a bit overstated — should retain veto powers in the organisation of global security in a world so changed. That point can be and has been made by several countries and many of them seek membership of the UNSC with equal vehemence. If the G4 has chosen to come together and make their case, how can anyone object? 
Will they succeed? No harm trying. Does India weaken its case by aligning with the G4? Nonsense. China's argument that it would support India if it were to break ranks with Japan; and the US argument that it has no problem with India's candidature but remains conflicted on Germany over Italy and Brazil over Mexico, are all divide-and-rule tactics and have to be exposed as such. None of the P5 countries has given cast-iron guarantees to India that it would get India into the UNSC if it abandons the G4. So, the argument that the G4 route weakens India's case is a red herring. 
The G4 ought to in The G4 ought to include an African nation and also an Islamic nation. The case for an African nation is easily made and the African group at the UN has sought time-out till the group comes to a consensus on which country it wishes to support. South Africa has weakened its case under its present leadership and both Nigeria and Egypt have an equally strong case. Egypt is also an Islamic nation and one of the founder-leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement. 
In considering the utility of G4 for India, one must, however, look beyond the UNSC. The post-Cold War 21st-century world is increasingly defined by multiple partnerships between major and medium powers. Moreover, individual major powers have not hesitated to form like-minded groups and 'coalitions of the willing', primarily in pursuit of their own interests and, secondarily, the interests of the group. Consider some examples. 
Russia took the initiative to create Bric — Brazil, Russia, India, China — and China invited South Africa to form Brics. Both Russia and China have used Brics to leverage their own geopolitical and geo-economic interests in partnership with emerging economies Brazil, India and South Africa. One negative consequence of Brics has been that Brazil and South Africa have not found time for Ibsa (India, Brazil, South Africa) — the alliance of thirdworld democracies. 
On its part, China created the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) to pursue its geopolitical and geo-economic interests in Eurasia. The US has not hesitated to created mega-regional trade groups, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), to deal with the Chinese trade threat. Diplomats and analysts will debate forever on the usefulness of these and other such associations, groups, alliances and partnerships. Some succeed in their objectives, many fail. Yet, more are getting created. 
The world of many Gs may run the risk of becoming a world of GZero, a leaderless world, to use a phrase coined by strategic affairs analyst Ian Bremmer. But why should India, excluded from the board rooms, so to speak, of so many post-war multilateral institutions worry? 
For India, G4 also has another relevance. As a resources-deficient, capital-deficient and technology-importing economy, India can gain from closer relations with Japan, Germany and Brazil. It may serve India well to engage them on a wider set of issues, including trade, climate change, migration, intellectual property rights and technology transfer, regional security, terrorism et al, even if to keep the pot boiling. 
The writer is director for geo-economics and strategy, International Institute for Strategic Studies